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Abstract 
In this article I attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the philosophy of time to 
psychiatric, psychological and psychoanalytic theories of development and therapeutic 
action. In an accompanying article I established a range of relevant temporal concepts, 
emerging from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, with links made to Freudian 
concepts of time, in particular Nachträglichkeit, developed in the writings of 
psychoanalyst André  Green and philosopher Jacques Derrida. In this article I proceed to 
explore this philosophy of time through a consideration of the developmental theories and 
clinical approaches of Donald Winnicott, Jean Laplanche, André Green and Hans 
Loewald. I conclude by establishing that the temporalizing function of therapeutic action 
can be seen to be a core or essential element of work with patients presenting with so-
called borderline conditions. I demonstrate how a range of problems or ambiguities that 
coalesce around this condition (including dissociation, traumatization, self harm and brief 
reactive psychosis) can be understood in temporal terms. 
 
 
Introduction 
During therapeutic dialogue and interaction, both patient and clinicians are drawn to look 
back at questions of origin, cause and developmental formulation, at the same time as 
look forward to a future in terms of progress, outcome, resolution and so forth. In this 
article, I will seek to explore how a Heideggerian conceptualization of temporality can 
inform us about these notions of understanding time in terms of developmental origins 
and working with time in the clinic. I will draw particular reference to the understanding 
and treatment of borderline conditions. I have chosen this field of clinical work because, I 
will argue, the “borderline” concept as it is adopted in notions of “borderline 
phenomena”, “borderline personality organization” and “borderline personality disorder”, 
is ambiguous and problematic for the clinician because the prevailing theories of 
psychopathology that adopt it are excessively individualistic, categorical, intrapsychic and 
atemporal. I will begin by contextualising the “borderline” concept in terms of very 
specific cultural and historical determinants, and then attempt to describe developmental 
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origins and clinical approaches that are fundamentally temporal, and relate to the 
Heideggerian philosophical orientation I have elucidated.  
 
In the previous article I arrived at a thinking of time that began with Heidegger’s   
hermeneutic ontological orientation, where I elucidated concepts of Care, Geworfenheit 
(thrownness), Entwurfen (project) Umsicht (sight or practical circumspection) and being-
towards-death before extending this thinking via Green’s and Derrida’s reading of 
Freud’s oeuvre, in which Nachträglichkeit, re-presentation, bidirectional time, 
heterochronicity and, finally, différance, could be seen to permit a fuller understanding of 
historicity, facticity and potentiality that arguably remained consistent with the 
Heideggerian orientation. 
 
  We saw that Heidegger described the temporality of existence in terms of its futurity, its 
embeddedness in projects in which there is an intuitive understanding of motivation and 
purpose, the goals of which often defy explicit definition or representation in an objective 
or algorithmic sense. This temporal trajectory of existence fits within the broader horizon 
of mortality, worldhood and sociality from which we can only, in a derivative and 
secondary sense, extract ourselves to theorise or conceptualise our-selves as timeless, 
separate, knowable individuals. We saw that Green developed ideas about time in 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory to uphold the complexity of development and 
background, the double action of the repetition of past in the present and the present 
reconstruction of the past in therapeutic work. Here, the historical or temporal 
unconscious background is an active field of both of the psychopathology and of 
potentiation in the patient’s therapeutic future. And then we saw that Derrida’s 
deconstructive analysis of Freudian time showed that the unconscious field or 
background that is worked with therapeutically is ineliminable, always to an extent 
beyond us and always reduced or inextricably altered through our use of technical 
metaphors of interpretation. 
 
In this article I will firstly attempt to explore developmental notions of temporality 
further, where the conceptualizations of Jean Laplanche (otherness and the enigmatic 
signifier) and Donald Winnicott (unintegration and disintegration) introduce 
fundamentally temporal notions of developmental origins and temporality. These notions 
will be seen to be in a sense originary or foundational limits that pervade infantile, child 
and adult experience, and will thus be relevant to the clinical approach to time and 
temporality in the final part of this article, where a developmental orientation will be 
maintained and extended. This clinical approach will explore issues that seem to coalesce 
around so-called borderline conditions, including issues of “trauma”, “abuse”, 
“dissociation”, “self harm”, “suicidality”, “impulsivity” and “somatization”. 
 
The borderline concept has arisen with unstable, shifting meanings in the past 50 years. I 
have argued elsewhere (Cammell, 2014) that the borderline concept has necessarily 
arisen in our modern context as a simultaneously marginal and pervasive limit concept 
that exposes or challenges the limits of many of the contemporary schools of 
psychoanalytic, psychological and psychiatric theory and clinical practice. Clinically, 
there is the possibility that there is an open and heterogeneous range of experiences that 
become transformed behaviourally into a uniform and identifiable “borderline syndrome” 
(even if this varies subtly in type from practitioner to practitioner or model to model) 
when the “borderline individual” comes to interact with the modern clinical setting. Thus, 
at an individual and a contemporary cultural level many extreme and enduring problems 
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at the margins of experience, some related to aspects of gender difference, sexuality, 
aggression, and social disruption, may present under the guise of the “borderline” 
diagnosis.  
 
Wirth-Cauchon (2001), for example, argues that the borderline construct situates itself 
within conflicts around gender and sexual difference, taking over from hysteria which 
was a related limit concept in the Victorian era. In the age of hysteria, the hysteric may 
have appeared out of the dynamics of the inability to express the unthinkable, the will to 
implicit silencing, the action of taboo, privacy and secret. In the “borderline” era, the 
borderline may be a fragmented, chaotic expression of the limits of our permissivism, the 
after-effects of our openness to explicitness (sexual, violent, graphic) and the collision of 
our high ambitions for individualism (individual rights and responsibilities) with frank 
problems of neglect, omission and maltreatment seen in the formative course of 
individuals’ lives. The borderline individual’s experience is constructed from within a 
symbiotic relationship with the clinical and cultural elements of the organization of self 
experience. These individual and cultural elements reflect the terrain of the failed reach 
of our civility in terms of the purported control of the law and human services. This is the 
terrain of the brutal, the savage, the rough, the bad and inhumane ways we treat each 
other, our children, a terrain which is then related to by means of clinical sterilization, 
clinicalization, medicalization or technologization. Here, therapies could be seen as 
forms of (substitutive) care and in pursuing such forms of care, there is a risk of 
dehumanization, stigmatization and disenfranchisement of the individual.  In contrast to 
this, I would want to articulate a therapeutic stance in which the therapist is aware of their 
complicity in the creation of the borderline diagnosis or identity, and maintains 
something of a knowing and critical stance toward it in their interactions and 
relationships with individuals designated as “borderline”. The position of the therapist is 
to respect the uniqueness, complexity, autonomy, and “otherness” of the person 
presenting for therapeutic work. And in what follows, I will seek to establish that this 
stance can be best established through an awareness of and sensitivity to the types of 
temporal issues I will elucidate. To begin, then, I will first explore developmental notions 
of temporality further, where the conceptualizations of Jean Laplanche and Donald 
Winnicott introduce fundamentally temporal notions of developmental origins for any 
individual.  
 
Laplanche:  Nachträglichkeit, Translation, the Enigmatic 
Signifier and the Theory of General Seduction in Development 
One of the central themes in Laplanche’s (1987, 1990, 1992) writings is his attempt to 
retrieve elements of Freud’s early writings about traumatic seduction and expand these 
into a general theory of seduction where seduction is seen as foundational and universal 
in the development of the unconscious. As such, Laplanche is attempting to overcome the 
rupture in Freud’s work following his abandonment of the seduction theory by 
universalizing the processes of seduction and sexualisation (as a form of traumatic 
process). This is something that will become relevant to the clinical discussion below, 
when concepts of abuse and trauma are analysed critically. In his theory, Laplanche 
suggests that repression is a “failure of translation”, occurring because of the asymmetry 
between the child and caring adult. In the transactions between adult and child, there is a 
surplus (of meaning or understanding) which is nevertheless retained by the child, where 
repression is a form of implantation and deferral. This surplus originating from the adult 
can be conscious or unconscious, but for the infant or child the remnants or traces are 
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very much residually unconscious but reappear, in need of translation. Laplanche (1987, 
1990, 1992) refers to these remnants as enigmatic signifiers or messages, the unconscious 
representing a surplus of untranslated communication.  
 
For Laplanche, the small child is dependent upon the care of the adult, and has limited 
capacity to communicate, reliant upon the attentive, receptive and projective capacities of 
the carer. For the child, the primitive communication received by the carer is related to 
survival, adjustment and adaptation; whereas from the carer, usually the maternal figure, 
there is a surplus of communication, verbally and non-verbally, consciously and 
unconsciously, where other key elements are present such as the sexual and love 
components of the carer’s communication (the erotics of breastfeeding and physical 
nurturance, the love component of maternal investment and care) that the small child 
passively receives. Laplanche argues that at the broadest level this is a form of primal 
seduction.  
 
Thus, Laplanche’s project is to formulate a generalized theory of primal seduction which 
is cast in terms of foreign, enigmatic elements that the child is universally exposed to, 
beyond the more narrow focus of the abused child or the perverse patient, that were 
Freud’s more specific psychopathological foci and beyond a normative sequence of 
psychosexual development where there is an interrelationship between sexual 
drive/excitement and self-preservative biological needs cast in a normative, intrapsychic 
development sequence. Laplanche would argue that Freud’s radical discovery of infantile 
sexuality omits the relational components of otherness and differentiality at a primal or 
foundational level (presuming these emerge more significantly later in Freud’s Oedipal 
complex). Seduction, as such, is no longer an aberrant or “abusive” event, but a universal, 
primal one: 
 
I am, then, using the term primal seduction to describe a fundamental situation in which 
an adult proffers to a child verbal, nonverbal and even behavioural signifiers which are 
pregnant with unconscious sexual significations (1987, p. 126). 
 
Seduction and enigmatic signification lay the foundations for future sexuality and other 
unconsciously driven activity in terms of untranslated signifiers that have as their origins 
the otherness and differentiality of the adult world of the carer—otherness and 
differentiality encapsulating the horizon, what is “bigger and beyond” the infant in terms 
of the conscious and unconscious, verbal and nonverbal, affective and behavioural world 
and repetoir of the adult, featuresof which are enigmatically implanted within the future-
driven, drive-based developmental trajectory of the small child. Now, in this, 
Nachträglichkeit becomes the key concept in Laplanche’s theory of primal seduction 
Laplanche posits that Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit: 
 
 
contains both great richness and great ambiguity between a retrogressive and 
progressive directions. I want to account for this problem of the directional to and fro 
by arguing that, right at the start, there is something that goes in the direction from the 
past to the future, and in the direction from the adult to the baby, which I call the 
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implantation of the enigmatic message. This message is then retranslated following a 
temporal direction which is sometimes progressive and sometimes retrogressive 
(according to my general model of translation) (p. 222).  
 
Here, translation refers to a passive form of repression where undifferentiated, 
unassimilated “enigmatic messages” are retained and constitute the drive from without, 
sexual or otherwise. This radical reconceptualization of the drive is not in some 
essentialist, biological account being related to an originary somatic source so much as 
necessarily formed by implantations by the other. Every act of translation involves an 
incorporation or binding integration of the enigmatic signifier into the ego and its internal 
objects, where any untranslated remainder remains unconscious. In fact, Laplanche holds 
that there is always an unconscious surplus or excess, which he terms the source-object, 
an object that collapses the Freudian distinction between an external object of the drive 
(an external object that enables the drive to achieve cathexis and satisfaction) and its 
source (a stimulus or excitement in an erotogenic zone). Laplanche’s source-object is a 
repressed, internalized fragment that becomes the source of the exciting, traumatizing 
drives pressing toward discharge, impinging the homeostatic body-ego from within. 
These drives are a combination of exogenous by-products of implantations that are 
residual secondary to the infants failed attempts at translation and binding leading to 
repression. The translation process partially alleviates repression as a process of 
sublimation. 
 
As such Laplanche’s revision of Freudian metapsychology involves the seductive-
traumatic action of the other as the foundational origin of the drive in infant development, 
as well as the defensive, metabolizing process of translation and binding of the other’s 
implantations by the subject through processes of repression and sublimation, which are 
ego processes that bind and integrate. By linking translation and Nachträglichkeit, 
Laplanche conceptualizes a matrix of origins that are relational but also temporal, 
destined to be repressed and worked through, remaining residual as unconscious 
enigmatic signifiers and source-objects. This process of translation, and the temporal 
function of nachträglichkeit in Laplanche’s model of primary seduction, fits the 
descriptions of temporality derived in the preceding accompanying article, referring to 
bidirectional time, re-presentation and différance (deferral, excess). 
 
Also of significance, are Laplanche’s descriptions of pathological forms of implantation, 
which will come to be of relevance in the clinical discussion of borderline experience 
below. In contrast with everyday, normal implantation, Laplanche (1990) postulates a 
violent, pathological form he calls intromission: 
 
Implantation is a process which is common, everyday, normal or neurotic. Beside it, as its 
violent variant, a place must be given to intromission. While implantation allows the 
individual to take things up actively, at once translating and repressing, one must try to 
conceive of a process which blocks this, short circuits the differentiation of the agencies 
in the process of their formation, and puts into the interior an element resistant to all 
metabolisation (1990, p. 136) 
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Intromission results in elements that cannot be subject to normal processes of repression-
translation—Laplanche (1990) refers to these elements as psychotic enclaves of 
untranslatable parental elements (conscious and unconscious, actions, relations, wishes, 
fantasies) that persist as untranslatable, foreign, unmetabolisable. Interestingly, at points 
Laplanche does allude to the possiblity of the superego, universally, as such a psychotic 
enclave which acts on the ego, while at other times he is referring to psychotic enclaves 
as a specifically pathological form of disturbance. In the following clinical discussion, 
Lapanche’s ideas on psychopathology will be explored further insofar as such 
untranslatable elements can be seen to play a role in borderline experience, and how a 
notion of intromission can be expanded beyond early development and be seen to become 
an element of borderline and dissociative phenomena. 
 
Ultimately, Laplanche’s conceptualizations of the enigmatic signifier, repression-
translation and Nachträglichkeit form part of a renewed, more encompassing theory of 
generalized seduction which includes the action of the other, unconsciously driven, on the 
origins of self or ego, in a form that develops the origins of the drive, in a relational and 
temporal situation that Laplanche refers to as the fundamental anthropological situation. 
And most importantly, Laplanche develops an understanding of the originary action of 
temporality in functions of Nachträglichkeit as bidirectional, involving différance and re-
presentation through the action of repression-translation, an action which can be 
extended to thinking about trauma and psychopathology at a relational and temporal 
level, something that will be advanced in the clinical section. What will be taken up now 
is some related thinking Winnicott (1971, 1974) developed in his thought around 
impingement, breakdown, unintegration, integration and disintegration, all of which has a 
fundamentally temporal character. 
 
Winnicott: The temporal action of integration and 
impingement in development 
Winnicott’s (1971) model of transitional phenomena highlights an understanding of early 
development as being primarily relational prior to any sense of a differentiated ego with 
boundaries between inner and outer, self and other, and so forth. Importantly, Winnicott 
also developed fundamentally temporal notions in his model of transitional experience. In 
Winnicott’s (1971) facilitating environment, the infant fluctuates between states of 
primitive anxiety and feelings of omnipotence where there is no sense of inner or outer. 
Impingements or failures of the environment that the infant may experience as milder 
primitive anxiety (if gentle enough), lead to an engagement with the world in which 
transitional states emerge with the development of a sense of projective intentionality and 
subjective objecthood (the classical example being self soothing with the transitional 
object). Progressively, play in the transitional space culminates in mature object relating 
(a mature sense of unitary self and world, self and others) but where there is still, for 
Winnicott, a privileging of play and transitional phenomena as being at the heart of 
mature health, creativity and vitality (aesthetic sensibility, intellectual endeavours, 
religious faith, other mature forms of pleasure and transcendence).  As such, two notions 
of developmental time operate can be seen to operate here: linear, progressive 
developmental time and regressive, unconscious time insofar as the self has a capacity to 
progress through different self states—mature objecthood, play/creativity in the 
transitional space, primary narcissistic states (e.g., narcosis) and profound impingement 
and environmental failure creating primitive anxieties. At the broadest level, the 
transitional object and transitional phenomena may be conceived of in three ways: firstly, 
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as typifying a phase in the child's normal emotional development in which processes of 
individuation are acted out in the process of play; secondly, where this play is used as a 
defense against separation anxiety (analogous with but considerably developing Freud’s 
discussions of the Fort-Da game, for example); and, lastly, as an articulation of a more 
universal sphere of agency and creativity that is intrinsic to our sense of engagement, 
dwelling and agency in the world.  
 
These Winnicottian conceptualizations illustrate a developmental component to the 
bidirectional temporality I have described. Here, temporality is constitutive of infant-
caregiver interactional patterns where there is an unfolding of processes of identity and 
differentiation, continuity and change, mutuality and intersubjectivity leading to an 
integrated sense of self in the world of others and objects. Thus, even though Winnicott 
did not conceptually advance a broader notion of Nachträglichkeit or temporality, he 
certainly emphasized the importance of continuity in time, of the self and other, in ego 
integration and a sense of self and reality. Another key contribution, here, is his 
distinction between unintegration, integration and disintegration.   
 
For Winnicott, unintegration represents a timeless, primal originary state that is 
immediately influenced by the facilitating environment in terms of environmental failures 
and impingements, leading to processes of transitional experience, potential space and 
ego integration. As such, unintegration could be seen to be an abstract or illusory origin 
for which there is a sense of nostalgia. In Winnicott’s theory temporal processes become 
active and understood in relation to absence and frustration: in Playing and Reality 
(1971) Winnicott lists at least three aspects of the ego sense of time: the experience of a 
time limit to frustration; a growing sense of process and remembering; and the capacity to 
integrate past, present and future. An important instance of the failure of ego to integrate 
experience in time is seen in the clinical “fear of breakdown” (1974). Clinically, the fear 
of breakdown is experienced as the fear of a “breakdown that has already been 
experienced” although developmentally it relates to an “unthinkable anxiety” that could 
never be integrated in time as a transitory event in the present and then, contained within 
temporal ego function, so continues to be experienced as the trace of a futural prospect of 
annihilation. This relates to other self-states Winnicott describes under the rubric of 
disintegration where there is a loss of continuity in space and time, and the self is 
experienced as fragmented, annihilated, depersonalized or subjected to the most primitive 
anxieties such as a fear of falling forever. Experiences of disintegration and fear of 
breakdown relate to severe or cumulative environmental failures and Winnicott (1962) 
described the development of a false self structure to overcome disintegration, breakdown 
and other instabilities of self. These forms of psychopathology, as well as the notions of 
integration and disintegration, will be relevant to my subsequent clinical discussion of 
borderline experience. What is of significance here, is the elucidation of the temporal 
qualities of Winnicottian concepts of integration, which relate to a differentiated, bound 
sense of time as an ego function; unintegration, as some form of illusory, atemporal 
origin for which there is idealization and nostalgia;, and disintegration, as a form of 
unbinding and loss of self in which past experience seems immediately present or futural 
in fragmentary states of primitive anxiety. 
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Concluding Comments about Temporality, Development and 
Developmental Psychopathology 
In the previous accompanying article, I advanced notions of Nachträglichkeit, re-
presentation, bidirectional time, heterochronicity and, finally, différance, that could be 
seen to permit a fuller understanding of historicity, facticity and potentiality that arguably 
remained consistent with the Heideggerian orientation to temporality. Here, I have sought 
to expand upon this in the developmental context more fully: origins of seduction 
(Laplanche) and primary narcissism/dependence (Winnicott) permit the action of the 
other to occur over time with ineffable temporal rhythms (presence/absence, 
frustration/relief, unconscious implantation) where ego or self integration processes are 
developed that are temporal in nature in keeping with our understanding of 
Nachträglichkeit and bidirectional time—processes of translation-repression and 
movements between integration and disintegration. We saw that drives, as a form of 
project, are inextricably linked to this developmental context even if our understanding of 
them is enigmatic or supplementary. 
 
We now also have the temporal foundations of an understanding of trauma, seen within a 
universal phenomenon of seduction as the imposition of the other upon the small child 
within the context of differential relating, which can in some way become excessive in 
the process of intromission of unassimilable, unmetabolisable experiences which will 
reside as unintegrated, psychosis-inducing fragments; as well as the notion of an 
excessive or cumulative experience of impingements (both as environmental failures and 
excessively active input from the care giver) that lead to self pathologies in terms of 
disintegration and defensive false self structures.  
 
What I will turn to, now, is an application of these philosophical and developmental 
principles concerning temporality, to the clinical treatment of borderline conditions. 
 
Winnicott, Green and Laplanche on the Temporality of Clinical 
Work 
In Winnicott’s (1971) thinking around the transitional, potential space of psychoanalysis, 
he describes elements of the temporality of play:  
 
 
I make my idea of play concrete by claiming that playing has a place and time. It is not 
inside by any use of the word (and it is unfortunately true that the word inside has very 
many and various uses in psychoanalytic discussion). Nor is it outside, that is to say, it 
is not part of the repudiated world, the not-me, that which the individual has decided 
to recognize (with whatever difficulty and even pain) as truly external, which is 
outside magical control. To control what is outside one has to do things, not simply 
think or wish, and doing things takes time. Playing is doing (p. 41). 
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Within the Winnicottian metaphorics of the clinical encounter, play occurs both within a 
relational and a temporal field. We are reminded of Winnicott’s (1971) developmental 
ideas about the timing of presences and absences, senses of integration and disintegration, 
effects of failure and impingement, leading to traumatic effects (impingements, loss of a 
sense of self and the real, false self structures and so on). Green (2002, pp. 110-130) 
extends the notions of the symbolization of play, reflecting on Freud’s ideas about the 
Fort/Da game, traumatic enactment and symbolization, expanding these ideas to a much 
broader field of “traumatic play” that occurs within the therapeutic space, in all manner of 
performative and narrative based expression and symbolization.  
 
Winnicott and Green: Traumatic Play in the Therapeutic 
Encounter 
Green (2002) develops a sophisticated theory of drive and object relations (the drive-
object, “objectalizing”) based upon many of the ideas Freud (1920-1922) develops in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, simultaneously linking and relating the Freudian 
conceptualizations of the pleasure and reality principle, Eros and Thanatos, Binding and 
Unbinding with more Winnicottian conceptualizations of play and trauma. Underlying 
this is a commitment to reinstate a drive theory, a commitment I do not necessarily share 
in the form it takes in Green’s (2002) theoretical elaboration, where I would see that there 
remains a risk of maintaining some form of deterministic, essentialistic or reductionistic 
system of energetics. Ricoeur’s (1965) work Freud and Philosophy conducts a careful 
analysis of the Freudian hermeneutic realm where the causal energetics of the drive 
become inextricably linked to the domain of symbolic interpretation for the analyst, a 
hermeneutic link between energetics and meaning. In this work Ricoeur (1965) does 
repeatedly note the significance of Freud’s assertions of the timelessness of the 
unconscious and the Id, but Ricoeur does not undertake a broader analysis of Freudian 
time or temporality within this project. 
 
What is relevant for us, here, is the temporal element to traumatic play that Green 
develops from Winnicott’s work. This can be melded with the broader field of relational, 
somatic, affective and technical elements I have elaborated upon within my hermeneutic 
ontological framework. If we adhere to ideas of traumatic elements re-emerging 
repetitively, seemingly in an unthinking, compulsive sense, we can use notions of 
temporal rhythmicity (binding/unbinding, discontinuities/fragmentation) and the idea of 
these elements being somehow dissociated, unintegrated or outside time, in order to 
understand the requirement of a temporal quality to therapeutic action. Here, therapeutic 
work may relate to the “temporalizing” of traumatic elements as they are constructed, 
contextualized and worked through in the therapeutic relationship. Green (2002), aptly 
describes the challenges of work with borderline cases, or even defines borderline cases, 
in temporal terms: 
 
 
With borderline cases, the compulsion to repeat has revealed a psychic vocation whose 
purpose is anti-time. Everything has to return to the point where it began; it is not 
possible to consider any conflict with the minimum degree of suspension required for 
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it to be elaborated, and then, perhaps, overcome. Everything has to be actualized and 
exhausted on the spot; not only to prevent any progression, but also to prevent 
anything new from emerging (p. 121). 
 
I would add, here, further Winnicottian elements to the atemporal traumatic elements: 
features such as severe unthinkable acute psychic pain (as a form of archaic disintegration 
experience), suicidal thinking, other overwhelming states described as affective (pain, 
anxiety, horror, despair) or dissociative (depersonalized, derealized, disavowed, absent 
and so forth), experiences of psychic death that are also performatively expressed and 
thus highly dangerous insofar as they entail self harming or suicidal impulses. These 
elements, which seem so immediate and overwhelming, are difficult to work with, play 
with (saying this, in itself, seems glib or antithetical), re-temporalize or contextualize. All 
of the contextual, constructive work therapeutically (the relationship developed, the 
concern, the boundaries and limits, the empathic gestures) might have at their heart an 
attempt at establishing an enduring and intact temporal continuity in the therapeutic 
relationship. In Winnicott’s terms, the good-enough mother survives. In broader terms, 
the therapist maintains the context of the work, the good will and attempt to meet and 
engage in a working, constructive dialogue and interaction where it is necessary for the 
patient to see how he or she is held in mind, thought about, related to, responded to over 
time. All of this work has a temporal quality (the rhythm/regularity of the work, the 
reliable presence and absence of the therapist), all of the temporal elements to distinguish 
boundaries and borders around me and not-me, related to in terms of actions, utterances 
and discourse. The broader theoretical, conceptual or technical aspects to this therapeutic 
endeavour could be considered supplementary in Derridean terms. 
 
We can add to this a consideration of our earlier discussion of Laplanche’s (1990, 1992) 
formulation of a general theory of seduction, where his theorization of the formative 
impact of enigmatic signifiers, the impact of the other in the differential relationship as 
universally seductive and traumatic, and the ongoing temporal modes of translation-
repression, all fit within a theory of bidirectional developmental time. In the clinical 
setting, this enigmatic otherness constitutes an invitation to seduce or be seduced (with all 
of the “sexual”, “aggressive”, abusive”, “traumatic” or other overtones this may 
engender) both directed toward the patient and the therapist alike. It constitutes the 
general field of traumatic enactment and play that is relationally based and constituted by 
the therapist and patient alike. To maintain a differential orientation, the therapist must 
maintain a thoughtful stance giving him or herself the opportunity (“giving him or herself 
time”) to think temporally from within the field, with and for the patient so that the 
patient can come to do this more so with and for themselves. And this process is not 
merely a past-focussed, reconstructive, insight-forming process. It is a process of 
potentiation and becoming that hopefully facilitates broader growth and change for the 
patient. 
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Loewald and the Therapist’s Sicht 
Loewald (1980), in papers such as “The Experience of Time” and “On the Therapeutic 
Action of Psychoanalysis” was keenly interested in the futural focus of the psychoanalyst 
in what he termed the “teleological” aspects of psychoanalysis. In his view, the process is 
always guided by the analyst’s awareness of the patient’s true form or “emerging core”. 
The analyst must hold this in trust to steer the process: “It is this core, rudimentary and 
vague as it may be, to which the analyst has reference when he interprets transferences 
and defences, and not some abstract concept of reality or normality” (p. 229). 
 
In a broader field than the traditional analytic field of one-person interpretation what does 
this mean? The therapist somehow maintains a temporal focus, working with the patient 
within a space of potentiation to construct, contextualize, constitute and understand the 
therapeutic process in a temporal sense: a broad field of discussing, reflecting upon, 
differing about “what you’re doing”, “what I’m doing”, “what we’re doing” where 
“doing”, in the broadest sense of play, refers to a whole experiential-relational field of 
narrative and performative expression. It fits into and melds with the context, what the 
therapist does and says, what can and can’t be offered and so forth. The therapist thinks 
about those alteritous, enigmatic elements that impact upon the space. In a traumatic 
sense, these are important to think about and this requires some restraint and maintenance 
of a space for the patient to articulate, work on and play with these elements, and for the 
therapist to think about and respond to them from within a differential relationship. The 
therapist must be mindful of this, and this requires an awareness of and cultivation of a 
differential setting within which this can occur (a setting of thought, observation, 
consideration and deliberate responsiveness). As such, this is not just a therapeutic 
process of therapist and patient meeting in the here and now, where the therapist attempts 
to attune to and connect with their patient without a sensibility to temporal elements. 
Although this kind of present-focused process is important, and it is articulated well by 
Daniel Stern (2004) describing moments of meeting, attunement, and implicit relational 
processes that assist in the development of a sense of relational self, even Stern (2004, pp. 
197-218) does not hold to ignoring the action of the past on the present in the therapeutic 
processes he describes in his own work and the work described by the Boston Process 
Change Study Group.  
 
The therapist does and must take up the opportunity to engage with, play with and change 
with their patient in the present moment, but also, at the same time, in an enigmatic way 
influence their patient where a significant part of this influence involves a number of 
temporal actions with and for the patient: reflection upon, coming to terms with, working 
through, anticipating, projecting and so forth. In the sense of trauma, this temporalizing 
action may take the form of restoring elements to their place in the past, or it may be an 
attempt at restoring a futural focus. If this refers to understandable, discrete, traumatic 
events it can be a sense of the balance between “getting over” something and “getting on 
with life” in a process of restoring some sense of temporal balance alongside balance in 
the other aspects of being described in my hermeneutic ontological framework. However 
many elements are more enigmatic, less understandable in that literally traumatic sense, 
and the therapist cannot claim to arbitrate and interpret all of these with an objective or 
omniscient stance. Chronologically, the earlier the “events”, the more implicitly, 
enigmatically retained or understood they may be. There is no sense that one can reliably 
attempt to reconstruct a reality or an insight in this. In spite of the many vacillations and 
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complex statements Freud made about actual trauma, intrapsychic trauma, seduction, 
phantasy and wish, which have become a core element of the controversial heritage and 
contestability of his body of work, Freud (1917) did hold to the ambiguity between truth 
and falsehood in “traumatic experience”:  
 
If infantile experiences brought to light by analysis were invariably real, we should feel 
that we were standing on firm ground; if they were regularly falsified and revealed as 
inventions, as phantasies of the patient, we should be obliged to abandon this shaky 
ground and look for salvation elsewhere. But neither of these things is the case: the 
position can be shown that the childhood experiences constructed or remembered in 
analysis are sometimes indisputably false and sometimes equally certainly correct, and in 
most cases compounded of truth and falsehood (p. 367). 
 
Elsewhere, Freud (1900), also, described hysterical symptoms as being more than just 
traumatic remnants in a mnemic sense: “Hysterical symptoms are not attached to actual 
memories, but to phantasies erected on the basis of memories” (p. 491). 
 
Further aspects of the Temporalizing function of Therapy with 
So-called Borderline Conditions 
If, in my analysis, I extend this notion of “hysterical” symptoms being mediated 
unconsciously to all manner of processes of expression or articulation that are 
relationally, temporally, somatically, affectively and technically derived, it becomes 
evermore complex. What the therapist can hope to do is establish a sense of relatedness, 
dwelling and sharing in this context of limits, alterity and complexity. What the therapist 
can be mindful of, here, is the manner in which the temporalizing function creates room 
or space for this relating, for dreaming and thinking, interpreting and understanding 
where previously there wasn’t.  
 
Thinkers of the Intersubjective School have articulated some related ideas in their 
writings on trauma work. Stolorow (2011a, b; 2009), for example, elaborates his own 
conceptualization of relational trauma and relational work that establishes kinship-in-
finitude: he uses the philosophical conceptualisations of Critchley and Derrida on death 
and mourning, and adapts the Heideggerian concept of Mitsein (and in particular, being-
towards-death, solicitude and authenticity), to articulate how relational work can re-
establish a sense of temporal and relational functioning after trauma. Orange (2011) 
describes how dialogue, in all of its metaphorical complexity, can help to understand and 
overcome the most complex or inarticulable elements of traumatic “experience”, where 
creative dialogue and metaphoric play can form a part of therapeutic work. In thinking at 
this level, we are aware of the limits of explicit, conscious work on identifiable traumatic 
elements (imaginal re-exposure, integration work, and so forth): some of the work may 
simply be levelled at attempts at re-establishing temporal, relational, affective and 
somatic links. In doing this, we have an orientation for approaching unconscious work 
with the traumatized unconscious that is much broader, temporally and relationally 
attuned and able to approach the complexity of the action of trauma which may become 
manifest in all manner of atemporal, non-relational, unresolved, unformulated, 
dissociated, psychotic, unsymbolized, somatic, and affective fragments of expression or 
gesture.  
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I believe that many of the problems around understanding the temporality or historicity of 
what I loosely call the traumatized unconscious may be addressed using this type of 
relational, temporalizing therapeutic stance grounded in my hermeneutic ontological 
approach. This can be considered, for example, in cases of brief reactive psychosis, 
dissociative psychosis, or what since the mid to late nineteenth century have been known 
as hysterical psychoses (see van der Hart et al., 1993). In some ways, hysterical psychosis 
could be described as involving forms of splitting and fragmentation that lead to personal 
modes of expression (acting, speaking, self-interpreting) which rely on fragmentary 
experiences, descriptions or expressions which seem narrow and limited, often with a 
literal and concrete quality, which can be overcome through the kind of therapeutic work 
I am describing. Often these presentations seem to relate to an event of re-traumatization, 
sometimes with a “determined” feel to it (linked to repetition compulsion) in which the 
subsequent decompensation may have psychotic elements (persecutory and grandiose) as 
well as more dissociative elements related to a disjointed sense of self, time, others and so 
forth. There may be concrete and fragmentary symptoms (conversion symptoms, 
symptoms akin to somatoform dissociation) that seem to have a mnemic or symbolic 
quality that the patient cannot consciously acknowledge. The present interpersonal 
situation (therapeutically or extratherapeutically) can be responded to as a form of “re-
traumatization” leading to a sense of fragmentation or dissociation, somatic and affective 
experiences that feel real and in the present, and interpretations of occurrences that meld 
the past and the present in a narrowed down, collapsed form of temporality as if it were 
all appearing in a fragmentary form in the present-day. 
 
Interpretively, repetitive efforts made at linking the re-traumatizing event to the concrete 
psychotic state (referring to splitting and projective mechanisms) would not lead to an 
“ahah” moment where an insightful awareness crystallizes and the psychotic state 
resolves, losing its “literal realness”. Rather than asserting an explanation or a causal 
understanding the therapist opts for exploring the experiences and events in a more open 
approach, dialogically, facilitating a dwelling in and reflecting upon the experiences 
together, describing them together and exploring them for their possibilities. The therapist 
actively attempts to disentangle what is past and what is present, what is attributable to 
the patient or to the other (which could be the therapist him or herself), defining borders 
and boundaries in the work, relationalizing and temporalizing the work in the manner I 
have already described above. In doing this, there may be a gradual restoration of a sense 
of self and place and time, and with this is a gradual working through of what begin to 
crystallize as “memories” as if from the current day viewpoint what couldn’t be 
comprehended is now “seen”.  
 
As this process develops, the patient experiences the return of a sense of self awareness 
and reflectiveness, a capacity to self interpret and a gradual recovery of themselves as not 
overcome by two separate forms of objective presence: the event of re-traumatization and 
the psychotic state. They feel they can descriptively explore the complex moods and 
feelings—they may be senses of violation, self-loathing, shame, disgust, anger—and link 
these to the described past and present events and occasions which are acknowledged to 
be only partially apprehended or understood as memories. Here, we may be dealing with 
complex interpersonal experiences and events, with no objectifiable truth or 
understanding, and with the possibility of limits of understanding, memory or 
comprehensibility. There is no sense that this is fully resolved or worked through so 
much as a sense that the patient has somehow recovered themselves to go on with the 
work of the therapy in all its complexity, openness and potentiality. 
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This kind of case can be explored in such a way in order to elaborate upon how a 
therapeutic process in which the patient and therapist dwell together more openly and 
attempt to experience, relate to, describe and explore the hidden and concealed in what 
the patient experiences without the inference of causal mechanisms, definitive 
explanation or reference to forms of objective presence leads to the sense of a more 
complex self structure which is analogous in some ways to Heidegger’s Care structure in 
its relationality and temporality. This is the case because it involves an overcoming of 
self-splitting which features modes of self-interpretation which have recourse to objective 
presence. Other modes of self-functioning, what Heidegger might call more authentic 
modes, are recovered and these relate to aspects of the Care structure in its temporal 
historicity (how thrownness and projection are implicated in a present moment that 
seemed seized by the past re-traumatizing event and the continuously “present” 
dissociative or psychotic states). This recovery is facilitated by the reciprocal process of 
dwelling together which facilitated mutual awareness (what Heidegger called doubling or 
empathy) something recovered after relational events in which doubling or empathy do 
not feature. 
 
Conclusion 
I have deliberately spoken about this in general and abstract terms in order to encapsulate 
this type of work in a way that encompasses many different iterations and forms of 
complexity. One can think of cases of hysterical psychosis one has seen, or even 
generalize this type of relational and temporalizing stance to many other forms of clinical 
situations or clinical work where the expression of apparently enigmatic unconscious, 
dissociative or psychotic elements are worked through, understood and contextualized in 
a relational and temporalizing therapeutic process. It can incorporate all manner of 
complex and fragmentary affective, somatic disturbances, relational problems and 
dissociative disturbances featuring discontinuity and disintegration. For example, I could 
refer to Bromberg’s (1995, 1998) conceptualization of multiple selves, traumatisation, 
and the understanding of dissociative identity disorder or multiple personality disorder 
being seen as an extreme variant of selfhood which is universally conceptualized as 
multiplicitous, the norm of which involves “standing in the spaces”. One can apply the 
temporalizing form of relational work I describe here to this domain, where stable, self-
attributed identities can be seen as a developmentally appropriate but restrictive form of 
trauma response that require validation and empathy but also addressed with 
understanding and contextualisation with a view to working through and overcoming.  
 
An important emphasis has been placed upon a broad notion of play that encapsulates 
more discursive and performative elements than Winnicott (1971) originally described. 
These elements, unconscious, enigmatic and traumatic, become temporalized in such a 
way as the patient is more open to the complexity of their being, less affected by the 
intrusive, fragmentary, disintegrating and unbound elements that had existed without a 
temporalizing, restorative function found in play with others. This is what is 
therapeutically discovered as a form of true self found in dialogue and relationship with 
the therapist. The temporal movement in this work helps to re-situate the individual in a 
space of care with the therapist, which becomes an expressive and performative 
microcosm of a broader horizon of care in life outside the consulting room. What the 
patient may gain is more of a sense of themselves, their own being, and authenticity in 
their relationship with themselves and others. The intrusive, enigmatic and fragmentary 
unconscious intrusions or impingements are less narrowing, alienating or destabilizing, as 
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these have been shared and contextualized so as to create a clearing, a space from which 
to consider the future as an horizon. The patient is no longer confronted by death (psychic 
death, suicide) as an immediate prospect or already experienced annihilation, so much as 
an horizon of finality and alterity that can be comported towards, related to with others 
within the project of life, but thankfully deferred. 
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